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Minority Entrepreneurs and Fast Failure 
 
Minority businesses now make up more than a quarter 
of all U.S. businesses; yet, due to discriminatory lending prac-
tices, cultural aversions to debt, and limited access to capital, 
these businesses continue to have higher failure rates. At the 
same time, minority entrepreneurs are more likely to rely on 
informal lending and less likely to turn to bankruptcy for relief 
of debt. Doing so slows down failure for minority entrepre-
neurs—contra Silicon Valley’s new mantra, “fail fast”—and di-
minishes the minority entrepreneur’s ability to efficiently real-
locate resources towards more productive ventures. In this 
essay, I distinguish the minority entrepreneurial fast failure de-
cision from that of the majority entrepreneur and propose both 
private ordering and regulatory solutions that could help mi-
nority entrepreneurs fail faster. I begin by generally modeling 
the fast failure decision for the majority entrepreneur, high-
lighting the social costs of failing fast, and describing how for-
mal lending and bankruptcy affect this model. I then explain 
how this model is distorted for minority entrepreneurs by dis-
criminatory lending practices, cultural aversions to debt, and 
access to legal counsel. I conclude by suggesting, and critically 
assessing, proposals that could diminish these distortions, in-
cluding peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms, mandatory edu-
cational programs, color-blind and big data loan and credit as-
sessments, and minority loan subsidies. 
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 Minority businesses now make up more than a quarter 
of all U.S. business.1 This level of entrepreneurship represents a 
significant stride for minorities and could be the “key [for 
many] to escap[e] poverty.”2 That said, minority businesses also 
continue to have higher rates of failure than non-minority 
businesses.3 This high failure rate is not necessarily a forebod-
ing statistic in the context of entrepreneurship, but it becomes 
detrimental when minority entrepreneurs fail to recover as 
quickly as their majority counterparts. That is, “fast failure” is 
the new mantra among entrepreneurs4 and, while some criticize 
this slogan as nothing more than Silicon Valley “hype,”5 failure 
can produce significant educational and innovative benefits.6 
 
 1.  Minority Bus. Dev. Agency, Fact Sheet: U.S. Minority-Owned Firms (Jan. 2016), 
https://www.mbda.gov/sites/mbda.gov/files/migrated/files-
attachments/2012SBO_MBEFactSheet020216.pdf (hereinafter Fact Sheet). 
 2.  Reuben Abraham, Entrepreneurship key to escaping poverty, CNN (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/17/opinion/world-economic-forum-reuben-abraham/; see also 
Stephanie Rugolo, Increasing Entrepreneurship Is a Key to Lowering Poverty Rates, 
GOLDWATER INST. (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/en/work/topics/free-
enterprise/entrepreneurship/increasing-entrepreneurship-is-a-key-to-lowering-2/; STEPHEN 
SLIVINSKI, INCREASING ENTREPRENEURSHIP IS A KEY TO LOWERING POVERTY RATES, 
GOLDWATER Insti-
tute Policy REPORT (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.realclearmarkets.com/docs/2012/11/PR254%
20Increasing%20Entrepreneurship.pdf; The World Bank, Innovation & Entrepreneurship (Ju-
ly 8, 2015), http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/competitiveness/brief/innovation-
entrepreneurship. 
 3.  Rafael Efrat, Minority Entrepreneurs in Bankruptcy, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & 
POL’Y 95, 99, 121 (2008). 
 4.  See BERNHARD SCHROEDER, FAIL FAST OR WIN BIG 143–67 (2015); RYAN 
BABINEAUX & JOHN KRUMBOLTZ, FAIL FAST, FAIL OFTEN: HOW LOSING CAN HELP YOU 
WIN 23–52 (2013); John Donohue, Fail Fast, Fail Often, Fail Everywhere, THE NEW YORKER 
(May 31, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/fail-fast-fail-often-fail-
everywhere; Fail Often, Fail Well, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 14, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/18557776 (hereinafter Fail Often). 
 5.  See, e.g., Jon Terbush, The 14 Most Bullshit Motivational Slogans in Silicon Valley, 
GQ (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.gq.com/story/the-most-bullshit-motivational-slogans-in-
silicon-valley; Rob Ashgar, Why Silicon Valley’s ‘Fail Fast’ Mantra Is Just Hype, FORBES (July 
14, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robasghar/2014/07/14/why-silicon-valleys-fail-fast-
mantra-is-just-hype/#651681b324bc; Ajeet Khurana, Failure Is the New Buzzword, YOUR 
STORY (July 12, 2013), https://yourstory.com/2013/07/failure-is-the-new-buzzword/; 
 6.  See Fail Often, supra note 5; see generally BABINEAUX & KRUMBOLTZ, supra note 
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These benefits, however, depend on the entrepreneur’s ability 
to both fail and recover quickly. 
The problem for minority entrepreneurs is that they are 
failing slower than their majority counterparts.7 This result is 
likely due to their reliance on informal lending and aversion to 
bankruptcy.8 That is, without the contractual and legal mecha-
nisms of formal lending and bankruptcy, minority entrepre-
neurs are unable to efficiently organize debt obligations and re-
cover through a “fresh start.”9 
In this essay, I show that failing slowly not only inures 
the minority entrepreneur’s ability to learn and innovate, but 
also limits their ability to efficiently reallocate resources to-
wards more productive ventures.10 Thus, if “[e]ntrepreneurship 
[is, in fact,] key to escaping poverty,”11 and “failing fast” is es-
sential to productive entrepreneurship,12 minority entrepre-
neurs need access to contractual and legal mechanisms to en-
sure that, if their businesses fail, they fail fast. After 
demonstrating this result, I distinguish the minority entrepre-
neurial fast failure decision from that of the majority entrepre-
neur and propose both private and regulatory solutions that 
could help minority entrepreneurs fail faster.  
 
4; ED CATMULL & AMY WALLACE, CREATIVITY, INC.: OVERCOMING THE UNSEEN FORCES 
THAT STAND IN THE WAY OF TRUE INSPIRATION Ch. 6 (2014); GEORGE DEEB, 101 
STARTUP LESSONS: AN ENTREPRENEUR’S HANDBOOK 104 (2013); SUNIL GODSE, FAIL 
FAST. SUCCEED FASTER. (2013); SONIA LIN, SECRET TO STARTUP FAILURE: FAIL FAST. FAIL 
CHAP. FAIL HAPPY (2014); JOHN C. MAXWELL, FAILING FORWARD (2007); BERNARD 
SCHROEDER, Introduction to FAIL FAST OR WIN BIG: THE START-UP PLAN FOR STARTING 
NOW (2015). 
 7.  See Efrat, supra note 3, at 99, 121. Yet, it should be noted that “minority-owned 
small businesses are not significantly less profitable than majority-owned small businesses.” Id. 
at 74 (citing K.S. Cavalluzzo et al., Competition, Small Business Financing, and Discrimina-
tion: Evidence from a New Survey, 75 J. OF BUS. (1999)). 
 8.  Id. at 121. 
 9.  See infra Section II.C. 
 10.  See Javier Gimeno et al., Survival of the Fittest? Entrepreneurial Human Capital 
and the Persistence of Underperforming Firms, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 750, 750–51 (1997); Fahri 
Karakaya, Market Exit and Barriers to Exit: Theory and Practice, 17 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 
651, 659 (2000). 
 11.  See sources cited supra note 2. 
 12.  See sources cited in supra notes 4 & 5. 
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This comment proceeds as follows. In Section II, I pro-
vide a general model of the “typical entrepreneur’s”13 fast fail-
ure decision. This model compares the monetary benefits of 
delaying failure with the social costs. From this model, I con-
clude that, in the aggregate, it is more likely than not that the 
monetary benefits of fast failure are more valuable than the as-
sociated social costs for the typical entrepreneur. In doing so, I 
highlight that this conclusion rests on the assumption of formal 
lending and bankruptcy, decreasing the overall cost of failure by 
lowering transaction costs and forgiving part of the typical en-
trepreneur’s debts.  
In Section III, I turn to the fast failure decision for the 
minority entrepreneur and describe the distortions on the typi-
cal entrepreneur model that affect her decision. These distor-
tions include discrimination, cultural aversions, and lack of ac-
cess to legal counsel. I critically discuss existing proposals that 
could diminish these distortion costs and conclude that further 
innovation and intervention is necessary.  
In Section IV, I suggest a novel set of proposals, both 
private and regulatory, for diminishing these distortion costs. 
As a private ordering solution, I suggest using peer-to-peer 
(P2P) lending to circumvent the costs posed by discrimination 
and cultural aversions. I also suggest four incremental, regula-
tory proposals: first, a required educational program for those 
who obtain SBA loans that teaches borrows about the benefits 
of fast failure and bankruptcy; second, a truly color-blind loan 
application process; third, a requirement that loan applications 
being assessed using a process that avoids judgment of soft skills 
and rests on statistical methods that have been proven not to 
have a disparate impact on minority entrepreneurs; and fourth, 




 13.  By “typical entrepreneur,” I mean the average SBA borrower. 
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II. THE FAST FAILURE DECISION 
 
While fast failure is a moral truth among Silicon Valley entre-
preneurs,14and online fora provide varied advice on when an en-
trepreneur should call it quits,15 the general entrepreneurial fast 
failure decision has never been formally modeled.16 Thus, I 
begin by creating this model, highlighting the key considera-
tions of an entrepreneur deciding between accelerating or de-
celerating failure. After doing so, I further describe the social 
benefits and costs at stake in this decision and argue that, in 
most situations, the social costs of failing fast do not outweigh 
its monetary reward. I conclude by explaining how my model 
rests on the assumption that the entrepreneur take advantage of 
formal lending and bankruptcy, as contractual and legal mecha-
nisms affecting the speed and costs of failure and recovery.  
 
A. The General Model 
 
Most discussions of failing fast revolve around its educa-
tional and innovation benefits.17 Yet, there is also a straightfor-
ward economic argument for failing fast: if you know your 
 
 14.  Cf. sources cited in note 4. 
 15.  See, e.g., George Meszaros, 15 Ways Successful Entrepreneurs Know When to 
Give up or Keep Fighting, SUCCESS HARBOR (last visited May5, 2017), 
https://www.successharbor.com/entrepreneurs-know-give-forge-ahead-01192015/; Knowing 
When to Quit, ENTREPRENEUR (July 18, 2005), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/78774; 
Chand Brooks, Why the Best Entrepreneurs Know When to Quit, BUS. NEWS DAILY (May 21, 
2013), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/4520-entrepreneurs-know-when-to-quit.html. 
 16.  Fast failure has been formally explored in the context of pharmaceutical and techno-
logical innovation. See, e.g., Rajat Khanna et al., Fail Often, Fail Big, and Fail Fast? Learning 
from Small Failures and R&D Performance in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 59 ACAD. OF 
MGMT. J. 436, 436–37 (2016); Jim Shore, Fail fast [software debugging], IEEE SOFTWARE Vol. 
21:5, 21–25 (Sept.–Oct. 2004), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1331296/. In addition, 
while never using the term “fast failure,” the concept has been explored in the context of barri-
ers to market exit. See sources cited supra note 10. My model is consistent with these models, 
but simplifies the variables. 
 17.  See sources cited supra in note 5; see also Dean A. Shepherd, Learning from Busi-
ness Failure: Propositions of Grief Recovery for the Self-Employed, 28 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 
318, 319–20 (2003). 
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business is failing, then it is best to accelerate that failure as 
much as possible so that you can reallocate your resources to 
more productive ventures.18 A similar concept, market exit, has 
previously been modeled by marketing researchers.19 However, 
to more adequately account for entrepreneurial behavior and 
the distinctions between majority and minority entrepreneurs, I 
produce a more general model below.20 
To begin, I model the “fast failure” condition; namely, if 
failing fast is optimal, then the expected utility of failing fast, 
E(F), should be greater than the expected utility of delaying 
failure or extending survival, E(S): 
 (1) 𝐸𝐸(𝐹𝐹) > 𝐸𝐸(𝑆𝑆). 
 
Further, I assume that, at time n1, the entrepreneur knows that 
the business will fail, but also that the business can survive until 
some time n2. Essentially, the entrepreneur’s fast failure deci-
sion is whether to fail at n1 or n2.21 
Next, I define the expected value of extending survival as 
the difference between the individual social benefits accrued 
from extending survival, 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠,22 and the cost of failure at some 
time n2,𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛2: 
 (2) 𝐸𝐸(𝑆𝑆) = 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛2. 
 
Likewise, the expected value of failing fast is defined as the dif-
ference between the individual social costs of failing fast, 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹, 
 
 18.  Cf. Gimeno et al., supra note 10, at 750–51; Karakaya, supra note 10, at 659. 
 19.  See Gimeno et al., supra note 10, at 754–56. 
 20.  I do not claim my model is in any way inconsistent with Gimeno’s model of thresh-
olds of venture survival. Cf. id. I created a new model simply because I wanted to better account 
for the distortion costs in Section III. For more detail regarding the unique characteristics of 
successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs, I recommend a careful read of Gimeno’s piece. 
 21.  I forego this assumption and build a probabilistic model below. See infra equations 
(2p), (3p) and (1’p). 
 22.  See infra Section II.B. 
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such as decreased civic capital,23 and the cost of failure at some 
time n1 prior to n2: (3) 𝐸𝐸(𝐹𝐹) = −𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛1. 
 
At this point, an entrepreneur will opt to fail fast when 
the individual social costs of failing fast combined with the cost 
of failure at time n1 is less than the difference between the costs 
of failure at time n2 and the individual social benefits of extend-
ing survival; i.e., an entrepreneur will opt to fail fast when: 
 (1′) −𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛1 > 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛2.   24 
 
Next, I define the entrepreneur’s cost of failure at the 
end of year n, Cn, as the difference between an entrepreneur’s 
assets and liabilities at the end of year n. That is, assuming that 
the entrepreneur has an annually compounding loan with a 
term of n years, that the business’s assets depreciate at a nor-
malized rate, and that the business will fail in year n, the entre-
preneur’s cost of failure is 
 (4) 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 = −{𝑛𝑛(𝑅𝑅 − 𝐸𝐸) + 𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝑑𝑑)𝑛𝑛 − L(1 + 𝑖𝑖)𝑛𝑛}, 25 
 
where R= the entrepreneur’s average annual revenue, E = the 
entrepreneur’s average annual expenses, A = the value of the 
entrepreneur’s assets in year zero, d = the annual depreciation 
rate of the entrepreneur’s assets, L= the entrepreneur’s loan 
principal, and i = the entrepreneur’s annual compound interest 
rate on her loan.26 
 
 23.  For more examples, see infra Section II.C. One may argue that failure may increase 
social capital in spheres such as Silicon Valley; however, because this appears to be a relatively 
unique phenomenon, I do not integrate such benefits into this model. 
 24.  Because the individual social costs of failing fast and the costs of failure are negative 
values, the inequality is flipped. 
 25.  I have placed a negative value in front of this expression because, if a business is fail-
ing, the value will always be negative. 
 26.  I acknowledge that the threshold for failure is likely much more complicated than 
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The following example demonstrates the operation of 
this model. Suppose Joe is a typical entrepreneur looking to 
borrow money for a business venture.27 Joe needs a $300,000 
loan and has two options: obtain a 5-year loan at a 5% com-
pounded interest rate or obtain a 10-year loan at the same 
rate.28 Further, suppose Joe knows that, should his business plan 
be successful, he will be able to pay off this loan (with interest) 
after five years. However, if his business plan is unsuccessful, he 
will know by year five that his business is failing and can survive 
for only another five years. Finally, assume that at the termina-
tion of the loan, Joe will have no additional ways of capitalizing 
his business and will either need to pay off the loan or close his 
business. 
Using the numbers provided above, and assuming that (𝑅𝑅 − 𝐸𝐸)= $27,00029, A = $200,000, and d = 10% or 0.1, Joe’s 
cost of failure in year ten, 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛2, is approximately $148,932.70 
while his cost of failure in year five, 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛1, is only approximately 
$129,786.47. Thus, Joe would rationally choose to fail fast 
when: 
 (1′𝑎𝑎)  −𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − $129,786.47 > 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 − $148,932.70. 
 
That is, Joe will rationally prefer the 5-year loan when the sum 
of the individual social costs of failing fast and the individual 
social benefits of survival is less than $19,146.23; i.e., when: 
 
 
simply a function of assets and liabilities. See, e.g., Gimeno et al., supra note 10, at 753. 
 27.  Once again, I assume “typical” means the average SBA loan borrower. 
 28.  Note that the average SBA loan in 2015 was $371,628. Small Business Administra-
tion, 7(a) Loan Amounts, Fees & Interest Rates (last visited May 5, 2017), 
https://www.sba.gov/funding-programs/loans. The normal rate for the SBA loan is 3%. How-
ever, lenders may vary from that rate by at most 2.25%. Id.; see also Average Small Business 
Loan Interest Rates in 2017: Comparing Top Lenders, VALUE PENGUIN (last accessed Apr. 1, 
2017), https://www.valuepenguin.com/average-small-business-loan-interest-rates. 
 29.  Note that I have purposefully chosen a number that would entail Joe’s business 
would fail. If I chose a number in which Joe’s business would be successful, then Joe would not 
opt to fail faster. 
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(1′𝑎𝑎′)  𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 + 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 < $19,146.23. 
 
Figure 1 (below) depicts Joe’s cost of failure in year n, 
Cn, based on the facts above. In addition, Figure 1 depicts the 
additional annual cost of failure for each year Joe postpones 
failure, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛
 Notice that Joe’s cost of failure increases at a greater 
rate as time progresses. This is largely the effect of Joe’s com-
pounding interest rate on his loan and would be mitigated if he 
made annual interest payments towards it. That said, he would 
still suffer a significant cost by delaying failure. 
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Figure 1. Depiction of Cn and 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛




Before proceeding, I acknowledge and demonstrate that 
the assumption that the typical entrepreneur knows outright 
that their business will fail at year n is unproblematic. The ob-
jection runs that, because entrepreneurs often overestimate 
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their success,30 and because it is highly unlikely that an entre-
preneur will know their average revenue and expenses before 
beginning their venture, one must consider the probability of 
failure in framing the fast failure decision. This requires includ-
ing the coefficient 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛, the probability of failure at time n, in 
front of  𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 in the expected utility functions described above. 
Thus, E(S) becomes 
 (2𝑝𝑝) 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆) = 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛2𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛2,  
and E(F) becomes 
 (3𝑝𝑝) 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹) = −𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛1𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛1. 
 
The typical entrepreneur will rationally opt for faster failure 
when: 
 (1′𝑝𝑝)  −𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛1𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛1 > 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛2𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛2. 
 
For a numerical value on the probability of failure, the 
entrepreneur may look to the aggregate statistics from the 
Small Business Administration on the survival rates of small 
businesses. These rates follow an inverse, exponential curve in 
which approximately 80% of businesses survive their first year, 
50% survive after five years, and 33% survive after ten years.31 
Because, out of those businesses that did not survive, approxi-
mately one-third were successful and simply purchased,32 the 
entrepreneur may discount each non-survival rate by one-third. 
Returning to the hypothetical above, suppose that Joe 
uses these statistics to compute his probability of failure is 33% 
 
 30.  David Thesmar, Financial Contracting with Optimistic Entrepreneurs, 22 REV. OF 
FIN. STUD. 117, 117 (2009). 
 31.  See Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, Small Business Facts (last 
accessed May 5, 2017), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/Business-Survival.pdf. 
 32.  See Ryan Jorden, What Are the Real Small Business Survival Rates? LINKEDIN 
(Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140915223641-170128193-what-are-the-
real-small-business-survival-rates. 
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in year five and 44% in year ten. Joe would, therefore, rational-
ly opt to fail faster when:  
 (1′𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎)  −𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − (. 33)$129,786.47 > 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 − (.44)$148,932.70. 
 
In other words, Joe will rationally opt to fail faster when 
 (1′𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎′)  𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 + 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 < $22,700.85, 
 
which is only marginally more than the amount found in equa-
tion (1′a′) above. Thus, from this analysis, I have shown that 
Joe’s decision to fail fast is hardly altered when considered in 
the context of probabilities of failure rather than foreknowledge 
of failure.33 
In the end, the general model demonstrates that the in-
dividual social benefits of delaying failure and individual social 
costs of failing fast must be substantial for the entrepreneur to 
decide to extend the survival of her business. In the next subsec-
tion, I describe these individual social benefits and costs in fur-
ther detail and conclude that their aggregate social worth is, in 
most situations, likely less than the monetary value of failing 
fast. 
 
B. Barriers to Exit 
 
As mentioned above, failing fast may not be advanta-
geous to an entrepreneur if the monetary benefits of doing so 
are less than the sum of the individual social costs of failing fast 
 
 33.  Note, however, that other studies have found that “[i]f there is uncertainty about 
future payoffs, owners may be willing to accept low levels of performance with the hope that 
conditions will improve.” Gimeno et al., supra note 10, at 751 (citing generally AVINASH K. 
DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1994)). Because it is 
unclear what “low levels of performance” means in the model above, these studies are not nec-
essarily inconsistent with my finding that fast failure is still optimal under similar conditions 
when probability of failure is taken into account. 
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and the individual social benefits of delaying failure.34 These 
individual social costs and benefits belong to the broader cate-
gory of an entrepreneur’s “barriers to exit.”35 Below, I further 
detail these barriers to exit by explaining how failing fast can 
negatively affect individual stability and individual social capi-
tal. In addition, I discuss how delaying failure can increase an 
entrepreneur’s civic capital. Finally, I contrast these individual 
social costs and benefits with their aggregate counterparts. 
The individual social costs of failing fast are connected 
to individual stability and individual social capital. With respect 
to individual stability, business failure can cause entrepreneurs 
to suffer significant grief.36 That is, even serial entrepreneurs 
are motivated, beyond profit, by phenomena such as loyalty to a 
product, a market, or customers, as well as proving oneself.37 
Further, if the entrepreneur is engaged in a family-owned busi-
ness, failure can be even more detrimental because the business 
is “a context for family activity and [an] embodiment of its pride 
and identity.”38 Finally, “fear of the unknown” can deteriorate 
an entrepreneur’s confidence,39 motivating them to simply stay 
on course with their current failing venture. In total, these fac-
tors create significant grief in response to failure. 
Some scholars have suggested that delaying failure can 
diminish the intensity felt by entrepreneurs through the mech-
anism of anticipatory grief.40 That is, just as prolonging the life 
 
 34.  For simplicity, I do not discuss the benefits of innovation and education that are 
often pointed to within the failing fast literature. It is questionable whether these benefits are 
actually connected to failing fast in situations similar to the hypothetical above. That is, the en-
trepreneur has already failed, thus likely learned what caused the failure as well as thought of 
ways not to fail in the future. If anything, delaying failure as discussed above simply postpones 
the benefits of innovation. 
 35.  See Karakaya, supra note 10, at 651 (citing M.E. Porter, Please Note the Location 
of Nearest Exit, 19 CAL. MGMT. REV. 21, 21–33 (1976)). 
 36.  See Dean A. Shepherd, Note, Learning from Business Failure: Propositions of Grief 
Recovery for the Self-Employed, 28 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 318, 319–20 (2003). 
 37.  Id. at 319. 
 38.  Gimeno et al., supra note 10, at 751 (citing MARSHALL W. MEYER & LYNNE G. 
ZUCKER, PERMANENTLY FAILING ORGANIZATIONS 78 (1989)). 
 39.  See Karakaya, supra note 10, at 653. 
 40.  See Dean A. Shepherd et al., Moving Forward: Balancing the Financial and Emo-
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of a loved one who is terminally ill diminishes intensity of grief 
at their passing, prolonging the life of a failing business may 
diminish the intensity of grief at the moment of failure.41 
Yet, delaying failure may also increase the emotional 
commitment of the entrepreneur to the business venture 
through further financing and time commitments, and thus in-
tensify the grief at the loss of the business.42 Thus, while an en-
trepreneur may find some benefit from delaying failure, the in-
dividual stability benefits of doing so are likely limited.43 
With respect to individual social capital, failing as an en-
trepreneur in some communities can lead to being perceived as 
a drab businessman or businesswoman.44 That is, past and fu-
ture employees may become more skeptical of working with a 
failed entrepreneur.45 An owner who is willing to “redeploy as-
sets in a more profitable arena” may injure relationships with 
employees “who have developed firm-specific skills” and there-
by, at the close of the firm, lack job security.46 In addition, the 
entrepreneur’s ability to redeploy her assets toward a new busi-
ness venture may be diminished because her failure will lead in-
stitutions and her peers to view her as a riskier investment.47 
 
tional Costs of Business Failure, 24 J. OF BUS. VENTURING 134, 142 (2009). 
 41.  See id. at 139–40. 
 42.  See id. at 138–39. 
 43.  See id. at 142–43. 
 44.  Cf. Karakaya, supra note 10, at 653 (discussing how businesses that put out failed 
product lines can appear to be “drab businesses”). I admit that failure appears to have a counter-
effect, as a right of passage, within Silicon Valley culture. See, e.g., Rana Florida, Why You 
Should Brag About Your Failures, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 29, 2014), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/3037704/what-it-really-means-to-fail-forward. However, such 
an attitude is unique to the growing tech and biomedical industries and may not sustain itself. 
See Rory Carroll, Silicon Valley’s Culture of Behavior . . . and “the Walking Dead” It Leaves 
Behind, THE GUARDIAN (June 28, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/28/silicon-valley-startup-failure-culture-
success-myth. 
 45.  See Karakaya, supra note 10, at 653 (citing M. Wartenberg, How to Merge and Sur-
vive, 79 MGMT. REV. 64, 64–70 (1995)). 
 46.  Gimeno et al., supra note 10, at 751. The almost universal skill-set of programming 
is likely why the fail fast mentality has become so prominent in Silicon Valley. 
 47.  See infra Section II.C discussing the effect of formal lending on the model. Essen-
tially, a business failure may decrease a person’s credit score. 
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The individual social benefit of delaying failure for the 
typical entrepreneur is that it increases to the entrepreneur’s 
“civic capacity.”48 Small business owners will often “leverage fi-
nancial resources, cultivate political clout, establish civic alli-
ances, [and] gain access to local and citywide neighborhood 
planning debates.”49 Further, “institutional embeddedness” cre-
ates more opportunities for entrepreneurial rent-seeking. Thus, 
an entrepreneur that believes her venture could be successful 
after obtaining certain government benefits, or who is con-
cerned about influencing community projects, may rationally 
opt to delay failure. 
The social costs diminishing individual stability and so-
cial capital and the benefits of increasing civic capital are, in the 
aggregate, less likely desirable to society than the monetary 
benefits of failing fast. For example, while a surviving business 
may provide individual stability (and potentially stability within 
a community),50 it may make it more difficult for a community 
to attract investment because it will be identified as a stagnant 
or failing commercial area. Likewise, while an entrepreneur 
may take a hit to her reputation at the failure of her venture, 
this decrease in social and civic capital will likely be even more 
significant if it is discovered that the entrepreneur purposefully 
sustained her business to retain a position of influence. Thus, 
while the social costs of failing fast and the social benefits of de-
laying failure may be significant, it is likely more optimal for 
the typical entrepreneur to fail fast. 
 
C. The Effects of Formal Lending and Bankruptcy 
 
Formal lending and bankruptcy both incentivize and de-
ter fast failure. That is, while formal lending organizes the rela-
 
 48.  Stacey Sutton, Rethinking Commercial Revitalization: A Neighborhood Small 
Business Perspective, 24 ECON. DEV. Q. 352, 366 (2010). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See Shepherd et al., supra note 40, at 134. 
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tionships between creditors and debtors, it also relies on a cred-
it market that limits repeat entrepreneurs, who formerly failed, 
from receiving the same value from future loans.51 Further, 
while bankruptcy reorganizes debt obligations and provides a 
“fresh start” to failed entrepreneurs, these benefits may be used 
unadvisedly to allow an otherwise significantly failing business 
to survive in debt without absorbing the full monetary cost of 
such debt. I describe both of these considerations below as well 
as their effects on the typical entrepreneur model. 
 
1. Formal lending 
 
I define “formal lending” to include all transactions be-
tween a borrower and an arm’s length third party where busi-
ness capital is exchanged for a written contract to repay the 
amount to the third party at a specific interest rate, under a 
specific set of terms. By contrast, I define “informal lending” as 
any type of lending transaction that excludes one of the above 
conditions.  
While informal lending may cut down on the entrepre-
neur’s initial transaction costs, it also leads to a slower, more 
costly failure (amplifying 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛) because it does not, formally, re-
solve disputes that may arise in the lending process ex ante such 
as:  
• When will the loan be repaid? 
• How will the loan be repaid? 
• What happens if part of the loan is not repaid? 
• What happens if the borrower takes out another 
loan? 
That is, the informal lending increases transaction uncertainty, 
including “the ability [of each party] to establish property rights 
 
 51.  That is, they will likely have a higher interest rate on their repeat loans. 
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over their investments.”52 Without establishing such rights ex 
ante, these transaction costs are postponed and amplified.53 
In addition, informal borrowers “are more likely to de-
fault,”54 but less likely to participate in bankruptcy proceed-
ings.55  Because bankruptcy is a legal mechanism that speeds up 
failure,56 avoiding bankruptcy likely delays the failure process 
and adds additional costs to the entrepreneurs. This practice of 
avoiding bankruptcy is likely caused by the fact that informal 
creditors are typically not given priority in the entrepreneur’s 
reorganization of their debts.57 Thus, informal creditors, who 
are typically non-arm’s length parties, will pressure the entre-
preneur to repay their loan before paying off other debts or 
pursuing bankruptcy. 
While formal lending is thus generally advantageous for 
organizing debt obligations, it may also discourage entrepre-
neurs from speeding up failure due to its potentially detri-
mental effect on an entrepreneur’s credit rating. That is, if an 
entrepreneur knows she will not be able to pay off her debts 
with her current business venture, she may opt to postpone 
failure, continue paying interest on her loans, and then use her 
current credit to develop another business venture, from which 
she would hope to profit. This type of entrepreneurial behavior 
 
 52.  Harshana Kasseeah, The Performance of Small Firms: Does Formality Matter?, 28 
J. OF SMALL BUS. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 431, 432 (2016). 
 53.  I have not yet located literature that makes this general assertion; however, I believe 
the point is analogous to the common intuition among lawyers that carefully drafting contracts 
will decrease litigation costs. The problem here would be that some informal networks develop 
efficient norms that make formality in the transactions redundant. It is unclear whether infor-
mal lending has such norms. 
 54.  Edmund J. Malesky & Markus Taussig, Where Is Credit Due? Legal Institutions, 
Connections, and the Efficiency of Bank Lending in Vietnam, 25 JOURNAL OF LAW, 
ECONOMICS, & ORGANIZATION 535, 537 (2009). See also Meghana Ayyagari et al., Formal 
Versus Informal Finance: Evidence from China, 23 REV. OF FIN. STUDIES 3048, 3051–52 
(2010); Efrat, supra note 3, at 119 (discussing specifically the actions of minority entrepre-
neurs). 
 55.  See generally Amanda E. Dawsey & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Informal Bankruptcy, 
TWELFTH ANNUAL UTAH WINTER FINANCE CONFERENCE (2002), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=332161.nh 
 56.  See infra. 
 57.  See generally Dawsey & Ausubel, supra note 58. 
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is captured by the typical entrepreneur model described above 
because it presumes to encompass the total possible debt an en-
trepreneur could reasonably take on as well as the total annual 
average of her revenue over expenses, including any additional 
ventures that might be pursued. Therefore, while formal lend-
ing may discourage fast failure in some instances, these instanc-
es are accounted for in the model when the behavior of the en-




Likewise, bankruptcy is the unique legal mechanism that 
restores social and individual productivity to a failing firm.58 It 
increases the speed of failure by efficiently reorganizing the ob-
ligations of debtors as well as providing them with a “fresh 
start.”59 Yet, the “fresh start” policy may also incentivize entre-
preneurs to delay failure, permitting the entrepreneur to con-
tinue running a business with skyrocketing debts because it will 
be forgiven of a significant amount of such debt. Each of these 
points are discussed below. 
First, bankruptcy efficiently reorganizes the debts of an 
entrepreneur, reducing the total cost of failure by reducing the 
entrepreneur’s expenses.60 Without this reorganization mecha-
nism, “parties would [need] to contract out of bankruptcy and 
design their own arrangements for the case of insolvency” on a 
case-by-case basis,61 which would likely create a “hold-out in-
centive [for] the last creditor to threaten to upset the reorgani-
 
 58.  See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy Law for Productivity, 37 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 51, 88–95 (2002). 
 59.  See id. For a discussion of the distinctions between the commonly used mechanisms 
of Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and Chapter 13 as well as their utilization by entrepreneurs, see Si-
mon C. Parker, Law and the Economics of Entrepreneurship, 28 COM. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 695 
(2007). 
 60.  See Georgakopoulos, supra note 58, at 69–70. 
 61.  Id. at 70. 
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zation.”62 In addition, reorganization helps prevent false liqui-
dations—i.e., situations in which a firm appears to be failing, 
but is in actuality simply feeling the effects of a recession—by 
providing an alternative to imperfect auctions.63 That is, reor-
ganization provides the entrepreneur with more time to better 
evaluate her probability of failure, 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛.  
Second, the “fresh start” policy of bankruptcy essentially 
forgives “the debts of honest insolvent individuals”64 and, 
thereby, speeds up the failure of an entrepreneur by decreasing 
the cost of failure. That is, bankruptcy dampens the cost of fail-
ure, 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛, logarithmically by forgiving debts that would otherwise 
essentially enslave the debtor; this is represented by the func-
tion 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛 in Figure 2. 
 
 62.  Id. at 72. 
 63.  See id. at 73–74. 
 64.  Id. at 56. 
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Figure 2. Logarithmic Effect of Bankruptcy on the Gen-
eral Model of Cost of Failure.65
 
Without the “fresh start” policy, some entrepreneurs 
would be forced to “devot[e] the whole or a considerable por-
tion of [their] earnings for an indefinite time in the future to 
the payment of indebtedness incurred prior to [their] bankrupt-
cy.”66 Doing so would essentially force some failed entrepre-
neurs into “pauperism,” as any incentive to work for “material 
 
 65.  As this figure demonstrates, the cost of failure without bankruptcy increases over 
time significantly faster than the cost of failure with bankruptcy. 
 66.  Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934). 
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remuneration” would be significantly diminished because such 
remuneration would simply be passed straight to the debtors’ 
creditors.67 
This “fresh start” policy, however, could diminish an en-
trepreneur’s incentive to fail fast when the entrepreneur has al-
ready reached her maximum debt threshold such that all other 
incurred debt would be forgiven. In other words, if an entre-
preneur knows that filing for bankruptcy would likely mean 
that additional debt does not need to be paid off, then she has 
no monetary incentive to fail immediately instead of fail later 
because her cost of failure will remain the same.68 
While it may be questionable whether an entrepreneur 
could engage in such behavior and still satisfy the “good faith” 
requirement,69 the “fresh start” policy does significantly de-
crease the additional annual cost of failure for entrepreneurs 
who have reached their maximum debt threshold (represented 
in Figure 2 as 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵
𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛
). In doing so, the “fresh start” policy would 
likely allow an entrepreneur with marginal individual social 
benefits associated with delaying failure, or marginal individual 
social costs associated with immediate failure, to rationally opt 
to delay failure and thus create an aggregate social loss. 
 
 67.  Georgakopoulos, supra note 58, at 59. The “fresh start” policy may also be utilized 
to relieve debtors from certain contractual provisions that would slow down their ability to 
reenter the market after failure. See id. at 83–86. For example, debtors have been relieved of 
certain intellectual property agreements. See Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal 
Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985); Georgakopoulos, supra note 58, at 84, as well as 
certain non-competes: see In re Register, 95 Bankr. 73 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989); Geor-
gakopoulos, supra note 58, at 84. Some have argued against the “fresh start” policy, claiming 
that it pushes lenders to simply increase interest rates; however, such an increase would likely 
be negligible because there are already significantly low odds of repayment in situations where 
the “fresh start” policy is applied. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 58, at 59–60. Moreover, im-
plementations of more forgiving bankruptcy policies has actually demonstrated a higher corre-
lation of self-employment. See John Armour & Douglas J. Cumming, Bankruptcy Law & En-
trepreneurship, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 303 (2008). 
 68. Other than reallocating her resources toward more productive activity, or avoiding 
tax consequences which would, at most, simply be a decrease in the taxpayer’s basis in her busi-
ness’s property, see 26 U.S.C. § 108. 
 69.  See Georgakopoulos, supra note 58, at 56. 
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This result suggests further investigation of whether en-
trepreneurs could, or actually do, delay failure when they have 
reached their maximum debt threshold. Such an investigation is 
beyond the scope of this comment. For now, I believe I can as-
sume that such activity is not incentivized by the “fresh start” 
policy because because, even without this policy, most debtors 
in the hole enough to rely on the policy are unlikely to pay off  
their creditors;70 thus, the fact that they would get their debt 
forgiven is not dependent upon the “fresh start” policy. Instead, 
this policy is aimed more at improving the recovery of such 
debtors, incentivizing them to fail faster. 
In the end, formal lending and bankruptcy increase the 
entrepreneur’s speed of failure by organizing, reorganizing, and 
potentially forgiving an entrepreneur’s debt obligations. While 
the “fresh start” policy in bankruptcy may incentivize entrepre-
neurs to delay failure because they will only incur a minimal 
additional cost of failure, this incentive likely does not exist due 
to the “good faith” requirement and the actual benefits con-
ferred by the “fresh start” program.  
In this section, I created a general model of the fast fail-
ure decision for the typical entrepreneur, described and evalu-
ated the social benefits of delaying failure and the social costs of 
failing fast, and explained how formal lending and bankruptcy 
effect the fast failure decision. In the next section of this com-
ment, I now turn my focus to the application of this model to 
minority entrepreneurs. In doing so, I specifically discuss how 
discrimination and certain cultural aversions distort the fast 






 70.  See id. at 59–60. 
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III. DISTORTIONS TO THE MODEL FOR MINORITY 
ENTREPRENEURS 
 
As mentioned above, minority-owned firms represent 
more than a quarter of all U.S. businesses;71 and, commentators 
continue to point to minority entrepreneurship as a gateway to 
improving impoverished communities.72 Yet, minority busi-
nesses are also disproportionately underrepresented in bank-
ruptcy proceedings due to a prevalence of informal lending, 
73and there is a dearth of discussion of how this phenomenon 
affects the timing of failure for minority businesses. In this sec-
tion, I account for costs that distort the fast failure decision for 
low-income and minority entrepreneurs, 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷. In general, these 
costs distort the entrepreneur’s expected value of failing fast, 
𝐸𝐸(𝐹𝐹), by adding additional costs of access to mechanisms that 
encourage fast failure. The fast failure function for the minority 
entrepreneur thus becomes: 
 (3𝑚𝑚) 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚(𝐹𝐹) = −𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 − 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛1. 
 
This entails that fast failure is rational for the minority entre-
preneur only when: 
 (1′𝑚𝑚) −𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 − 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛1 > 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛2.74 
 
The distortion costs I will focus on in this section are 
discrimination, cultural aversions, and access to counsel. Each 
 
 71.  Fact Sheet, supra note 1. 
 72.  See sources cited supra note 2. 
 73.  Efrat, supra note 3, at 121–23. 
 74.  If one prefers the probabilistic model rather than the determinate future model, the 
expected value of failing fast for the minority entrepreneur would be (3𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚) 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀(𝐹𝐹) = −𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 − 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛1𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛1, 
and the minority entrepreneur would rationally opt to fail faster only when (1′𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚) −𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 − 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛1𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛1 > 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛2𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛2. 
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of these costs diminish the minority entrepreneur’s desire for, 
and access to, fast failure.75 By diminishing the minority entre-
preneur’s demand for and supply of fast failure, the resources of 
minority entrepreneurs will not be efficiently reallocated to 
more productive ventures as often as the typical entrepreneur. 
This entails both an individual social loss to the minority entre-
preneur as well as an aggregate social loss to the community. 
 
A. Discrimination in the Formal Lending Market 
 
One of the main causes for minority entrepreneurs’ dis-
proportionate under-participation in bankruptcy proceedings is 
that minority entrepreneurs rely heavily on informal lending.76 
This reliance developed because minority entrepreneurs gener-
ally have “diminished access to . . . debt financing.”77 That is, 
financial institutions are less likely to lend or provide adequate 
rates to minority entrepreneurs because they generally lack suf-
ficient information about  them; this lack of information results 
from the fact that often “minority entrepreneurs lack credit his-
tories or required collateral,78 have a lower loan application 
submission rate, [and] have fewer ties to financial institu-
tions.”79 Moreover, because this lack of information makes mi-
 
 75.  See A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV 
1725, 1743–70 (2004) (arguing that the structure of bankruptcy law does not provide nearly the 
same benefits to minorities as it does to non-minorities). But see Daniel Gill, Racial Bias Re-
flected in Bankruptcy Filings, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.bna.com/racial-
bias-reflected-n57982082087/ (discussing a recent panel which shared data that reflects African 
American debtors are significantly more likely to file Chapter 13 cases than Chapter 7, when 
compared to non-African debtors). 
 76.  Efrat, supra note 3, at 122. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  For example, in another empirical study, the interviewers learned that it took one 
minority entrepreneur five years to develop the credit necessary to take out a small business 
loan. See Sterling A. Bone et al., Rejected, Shackled, and Alone: The Impact of Systemic Re-
stricted Choice on Minority Consumers’ Construction of Self, 41 J. OF CONSUMER RES. 451, 
458, 465–67, 470–71 (August 2014). 
 79.  Efrat, supra note 3, at 99, 122 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Expanding Financ-
ing Opportunities for Minority Businesses, 2, 3, 11 (2004) (unpublished manuscript), Ying 
Lowrey, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Dynamics of Minority-Owned Employer establishments, 
1997-2001 9 (2005), https://www.sba.gov/advocacy/archived-owner-demographic-economic-
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nority entrepreneurs unlikely customers, some financial institu-
tions simply engage in “ethno-racial discrimination,” preclud-
ing minority entrepreneurs from even getting the chance to ap-
ply for the loan.80 This lack of information/discrimin-ation 
practice quickly becomes a vicious cycle as often the only way 
minority entrepreneurs can develop sufficient creditworthy in-
formation is by being able to take out loans at reasonable inter-
est rates. 
No doubt, discrimination based on race alone is techni-
cally prohibited by the The Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
(ECOA).81 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
has further broadly interpreted this law to mean that a creditor 
cannot, on the basis of race: “[r]efuse [a borrower] credit if 
[they] qualify for it; [d]iscourage [a borrower] from applying for 
credit; [o]ffer [a borrower] credit on terms that are less favora-
ble, like a higher interest rate, than terms offered to someone 
with similar qualifications; [and,] [c]lose [a borrower’s] ac-
count.”82 Yet, aggregate studies of lending practices continue to 
demonstrate that lending agencies discriminate against minori-
ty entrepreneurs.83 
For example, significant evidence shows that the average 
credit rating of minorities is lower than their non-minority 
counterparts.84 Moreover, “loan denial rates are significantly 
 
research (Archived), David L. Torres, Success and the Mexican American Businessperson, 6 
RES. IN THE SOC. ORGS. 313, 314 (1988), Arnold C. Cooper et al., New Business in America: 
The Firms and Their Owners 4 (1990) (unpublished manuscript), Tresa V. Menzies et al., A 
Study of Entrepreneurs’ Ethnic Involvement Utilizing Personal and Business Characteristics, 
20 CAN. COUNCIL FOR SMALL BUS. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 5 (2003)). 
 80.  Efrat, supra note 3, at 122. 
 81.  15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2012) (prohibiting “any creditor to discriminate against any 
applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of race”). 
 82.  Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, What protections do I have against credit 
discrimination, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (last accessed on April 14, 
2017) (emph. added), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/fair-lending/. 
 83.  See infra notes 84-97. 
 84.  Loren Henderson et al., Credit Where Credit is Due?: Race, Gender, and Discrim-
ination in the Credit Scores of Business Startups, 42 REV. BLACK POLIT. ECON. 459, (2015); 
see also Ken Cavalluzzo & John Wolken, Small Business Loan Turndowns, Personal Wealth, 
and Discrimination, 78 J. OF BUS. 2153 (2005). 
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higher for black-owned firms than for white-owned firms even 
after taking into account differences in an extensive array of 
measures of creditworthiness and other characteristics.”85 
In addition, discrimination is also prevalent at the 
threshold inquiry stage, prior to the application and denial 
stage.86 For example, a recent study examined the types of ques-
tions asked from, and information provided to, persons of dif-
ferent races at lending agencies.87 Three white, three black, and 
three Hispanic men—each dressed the same, with almost iden-
tical financials—were interviewed after inquiring at the same 
set of banks about a business loan of $65,000 to develop their 
computer services business.88 The white businessmen were pro-
vided the loan fees and loan terms  significantly more often 
than their minority counterparts.89 Further, the minority busi-
nessmen were asked more frequently to provide financial 
statements, tax returns, and bank account information.90 In ad-
dition, they were also asked more frequently about their per-
sonal savings and investments, credit card debt, and auto loan 
debt.91 Lastly, the minority businessmen were less frequently 
offered a business card, help with future banking needs, or help 
to complete the loan application.92 
In a broader study, when whites were asked what they 
sought for in a lender, they described the future lender as an 
“equal,” “friend,” and “partner.”93 In contrast, minorities re-
sponding to the same question simply stated they were looking 
for a “minority lending company,” or “for a ‘personal bank’ be-
 
 85.  David G. Blanchflower et al., Discrimination in the Small-Business Credit Market, 
85 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 930, 942–43 (2003). 
 86.  Bone et al., supra note 78, at 455. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id at 454–55. 
 89.  Id at 455. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 459–60. 
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cause there was ‘no hope’ with the big banks.”94 In general 
“[m]inority consumers described structural marketplace barri-
ers that prevented them from accessing financial resources.”95 
These practices of discrimination distort the minority 
entrepreneur’s choice between failing fast and delaying failure. 
That is, the minority entrepreneur faces an additional set of 
costs, which make obtaining a formal loan with a quicker ter-
mination far less desirable. Further, as discussed in the next 
subsection, perceptions of discrimination among minority en-
trepreneurs create cultural aversions to formal lending,96 in-
creasing the individual social costs of opting for fast failure.  
One set of scholars has suggested that the SBA guaran-
teed lending program provides a framework for limiting, and 
has actually limited, disparate impact discrimination in the 
lending industry.97 In general, the SBA guaranteed lending pro-
gram attempts to solve the asymmetric information problem 
that has led to the aggregate disparities in lending practices to-
ward minority and majority entrepreneurs.98 
That is, the SBA views the problem as follows. Minority 
entrepreneurs typically have lower loan approval rates, and 
higher interest rates on those loans that are approved.99 These 
results correlate with the finding that while “minority-owned 
small businesses are not significantly less profitable than ma-
jority-owned small businesses,”100 they do “tend to have a high-
er failure rate relative to White-owned businesses.”101 Further, 
 
 94.  Id. at 460. 
 95.  Id. at 465. 
 96.  See Blanchflower et al., supra note 85, 932–34. 
 97.  See Ben R. Craig et al., Small Firm Credit Market Discrimination, Small Business 
Administration Guaranteed Lending, and Local Market Economic Performance, 613 THE 
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 73, 75 (2007) 
(special issue “Advancing Research on Minority Entrepreneurship”). 
 98.  See id. 
 99.  See sources cited supra note 84. See also Blanchflower et al., supra note 85. 
 100.  Craig et al., supra note 97, at 74 (citing K.S. Cavalluzo et al., Competition, Small 
Business Financing, and Discrimination: Evidence from a New Survey, 75 J. OF BUS. 641, 641–
79 (2002)). 
 101.  Efrat, supra note 3, at 99 (citing U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce, Expanding Financing 
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both of these results correlate with the fact that “certain groups 
of minority entrepreneurs have lower education and lower 
managerial experience.”102 These effects are all consistent with 
the likely cause, namely the asymmetric information problem—
when a lender is assessing the likelihood of repayment of a mi-
nority-owned business, they will likely assess such a business as 
riskier than that of a majority-owned business because there is 
generally more information available about the latter.103 
The SBA’s solution is a guaranteed lending program 
that partially alleviates this asymmetric information problem by 
essentially subsidizing the minority’s higher probability of de-
fault with a guarantee on part of the loan provided to the small 
business.104 Currently, the SBA will guarantee as much as 85% 
on loans up to $150,000 and 75% on loans between $150,000 
and $5 million.105 This guarantee not only increases the supply 
of loans, but also lowers the interest rate on such loans, increas-
ing demand by less risky borrowers and ensuring a higher re-
payment rate.106 
The SBA guaranteed lending program has produced “a 
positive and significant impact on the average level of employ-
ment in a local market. . ., [and] the magnitude of this impact is 
relatively larger in high-minority markets.”107 Yet, while the 
SBA loan guarantee program appears to increase access to capi-
 
Opportunities for Minority Businesses, 2, 3, & 11 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
Efrat)). This higher failure rate has been blamed on “inferior human capital as certain groups of 
minority entrepreneurs have lower education and lower managerial experience,” as well as mi-
nority entrepreneurs’ “limited access to credit . . . due to lower asset levels.” Id.; see also Karlyn 
Mitchell & Douglas K. Pearce, Availability of Financing to Small Firms Using the Survey of 
Small Business Finances, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. 1–2 (2005)). 
 102.  Efrat, supra note 3, at 99–100 (citing U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce, Expanding Financ-
ing Opportunities for Minority Businesses, 13, 25 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author); Mitchell & Pearce, supra note 101. 
 103.  See Craig et al., supra note 97, at 74–75. 
 104.  See id. 
 105.  7(a) Loan Amounts, Fees & Interest Rates, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., 
https://www.sba.gov/loans-grants/see-what-sba-offers/sba-loan-programs/general-small-
business-loans-7a/7a-loan-amounts-fees-interest-rates (last visited July 5, 2017). 
 106.  See Craig et al., supra note 97, at 79–82. 
 107.  Id. at 92. 
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tal for minority entrepreneurs, there are no “direct measures of 
whether SBA guaranteed lending is really reducing discrimina-
tion at the microecono-mic level.”108 Thus, while the SBA guar-
anteed lending program increases the economic performance of 
minority-owned firms and, thereby, reduces the aggregate dis-
tortion costs of reliance on informal lending, it remains unclear 
whether it is actually combatting the individual distortion costs 
of discrimination that minority entrepreneurs must overcome 
in order to be fully on par with the typical entrepreneur in their 
fast failure decision. In Section IV, I propose a regulatory inter-
vention that would be modeled after the SBA guaranteed lend-
ing program, but specifically combat the individual distortion 
costs of discrimination.109 
 
B. Cultural Aversions 
In some minority communities, there is “strong[] social 
peer pressure and shame associated with bankruptcy filing.”110 
In others, there are “culturally embedded aversions to under-
taking debt.”111 Further, perceptions of discrimination can pro-
duce, or reinforce, cultural aversions to both formal debt and 
bankruptcy.112 Each of these cultural aversions distorts the ex-
pected value of failing fast for the minority entrepreneur by in-
creasing her cost of accessing and utilizing a culturally averse 
tool that would speed up her failure. Further, these costs may 
amplify the social costs of failure and the social benefits of sur-
vival already assessed by the typical entrepreneur.113 
 
 108.  Id. at 93. 
 109.  See infra Section IV.B.4. 
 110.  Efrat, supra note 3, at 122 (citing Thomas M. Begley et al., The Socio-Cultural En-
vironment for Entrepreneurship: A Comparison Between East Asian and Anglo-Saxon Coun-
tries, 32 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 537, 539 (2001)). 
 111.  Id. (citing Timothy Bates, Financing Small Business Creation: The Case of Chinese 
and Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurs, 12 J. BUS. VENTURING 109, 120–22 (1997), Timothy 
Bates, An Analysis of Korean-Immigrant-Owned Small-Business Start-Ups with Comparisons 
to African-American and Nonminority-Owned Firms, 30 URBAN AFF. Q. 227, 231 (1994)). 
 112.  See Blanchflower et al., supra note 85, at 932–34. 
 113.  See supra Section II.B. 
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As far as I am aware, there is not significant work being 
done to help minority entrepreneurs overcome these cultural 
aversions. In Section IV, I propose a modest educational pro-
gram that would help minority entrepreneurs internalize the 
benefits of fast failure and decrease these amplified social costs. 
 
C. Access to Legal Counsel 
 
Minorities typically have significantly lower asset levels 
than non-minorities.114 Further, they do not have the same ties 
to legal institutions as their majority counterparts.115 For exam-
ple, a recent empirical study found that “minority entrepre-
neurs in bankruptcy were less likely to have been represented 
by an attorney in the bankruptcy process than their non-
minority counterparts.”116 This lack of representation entails a 
delay in the failure of minority entrepreneurs as there will be 
increased transaction costs at each step of failure. This distor-
tion cost may be represented as either a delay on the timeline of 
actual failure within the general model or an incorrect proba-
bility of failure within the probabilistic model.117 
A recent proposal to a similar problem of lack of access 
to legal services suggests the equivalent of public defenders be 
provided for defendants in debt proceedings.118 Defendants 
would need to qualify as “low income,” set at 125% of the fed-
eral poverty line, to qualify for legal counsel.119 Such counsel 
could inform the debtor of the intricacies of bankruptcy,120 and 
may even be able to help the debtor overcome her cultural 
 
 114.  Alicia M. Robb & Robert W. Fairlie, Access to Financial Capital Among U.S. Busi-
nesses: The Case of African American Firms, 613 THE ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. 
AND SOC. SCI. 47, 55 (Sep. 2007) (“Advancing Research on Minority Entrepreneurship”). 
 115.  Efrat, supra note 3, at 122. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  See supra Section II.A. 
 118.  Joel Tay, Note, Consumer Debt Collection in Massachusetts: Is Civil Gideon a So-
lution?, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S1 (2017). 
 119.  Id. at S9. 
 120.  Id. at S3, n.10. 
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aversion to bankruptcy. This service could be provided for min-
imal costs,121 and would likely increase  aggregate efficiency by 
decreasing the transaction costs in reallocating the individual’s 
resources. That said, it remains unclear whether this proposal 
would ever be adopted given the strong legal presumption 
against a right to counsel “unless the defendant faces a potential 
deprivation of physical liberty.”122 Moreover, legal counsel 
would likely only be available ex post, resulting in a minimal ef-
fect on the initial fast failure decision. I attempt to resolve this 
ex post problem in Section IV with a modest educational pro-
gram that could provide baseline guidance to borrowers prior 
to their fast failure decision. 
In the end, the expected value of fast failure for the mi-
nority entrepreneur is distorted by the costs of discrimination, 
cultural aversion, and lack of access to counsel. While the SBA 
loan guarantee program provides increased access to capital for 
the minority entrepreneur, it does not directly address these 
costs. Likewise, while access to a public defender would help 
the minority entrepreneur resolve debt disputes ex post, it 
would fail to address the lack of guidance when making their 
fast failure decision. In the next section, I discuss direct solu-
tions to diminishing these distortion costs and helping the mi-
nority entrepreneur face the same fast failure decision as the 
typical entrepreneur.  
 
IV. PROPOSALS TO DIMINISH THE DISTORTION 
COSTS ON THE FAST FAILURE DECISION FOR 
MINORITY ENTREPRENEURS 
If minority entrepreneurs delay failure because of the 
distortion costs described above, they will likely use resources 
inefficiently. Further, they will not be able to compete with 
 
 121.  Id. at S9. 
 122.  Id. at S5 (citing Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981)). 
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non-minority entrepreneurs who engaged in similarly failed 
ventures and were able to innovate and learn from such ven-
tures. Thus, to both ensure the efficient reallocation of re-
sources as well as equality of opportunity for minority entre-
preneurs, it is imperative to diminish these distortion costs.  
In the following section, I present a set of possible rem-
edies to diminish the distortion costs discussed above. I begin 
by describing a possible private ordering solution to discrimina-
tion and cultural aversion costs through the emerging peer-to-
peer (P2P) lending industry. While P2P lending still remains 
promising, it is unclear whether it can resolve these concerns in 
its current form because of ambiguities in the law surrounding 
these lending platforms as well as social network effects that 
could potentially incur an increase in discrimination.  
Without a private ordering solution, I turn to a set of 
incremental regulatory proposals. First, I propose a modest 
mandatory educational program for small business borrowers 
that would decrease access to counsel costs by informing them 
of the efficiencies of failing fast as well as utilizing formal lend-
ing services and bankruptcy laws.  Next, to diminish discrimina-
tion costs, I initially propose a blind loan application process 
that would isolate the instances in which discrimination could 
occur and ensure that race is not a factor in the loan application 
process. Yet, because relying on non-racial data may permit 
lending institutions to still rely heavily on red-lining and other 
disparate impact tactics, I propose a higher standard for banks 
when assessing a loan application that directly confronts dispar-
ate impact. Finally, to diminish remaining disparate impact dis-
crimination and cultural aversion costs, I propose a loan guar-
antee program like the SBA Loan Guarantee program that is 
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A. Peer-to-Peer Lending 
 
P2P lending essentially provides an online platform for 
individuals (and institutions) “to borrow and loan mon-
ey.”123P2P lending could diminish the distortion costs of dis-
crimination by providing a method for minority entrepreneurs 
to apply for a loan without revealing their race. Further, it can 
diminish the distortion costs associated with a minority entre-
preneur’s cultural aversions to formal borrowing by making the 
transaction more private and accessible. That said, P2P lending 
may actually lead to increased discrimination costs because in-
dividual lenders are not regulated by the ECOA, nor the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).124 Further, because P2P 
lending currently serves only a minimal number of small busi-
nesses,125 it is unclear whether it will be able to move into the 
small business loan market. 
My description of P2P focuses on “the two primary plat-
forms,” Prosper and Lending Club, which currently facilitate 
“98% of [P2P] loans in the United States.”126 These lending in-
stitutions allow potential borrowers to begin their quest for a 
loan by completing an application on their host website.127 This 
application typically requires providing only a home address, 
email, type of loan, loan amount requested, employment status, 
annual income, credit score, and age.128 To qualify for a loan 
 
 123.  Zachary Adams Mason, Online Loans Across State Lines: Protecting Peer-to-Peer 
Lending Through the Exportation Doctrine, 105 GEO. L.J. 217, 220 (2016–17). 
 124.  12 U.S.C. § 2901; see Lisa T. Alexander, Cyberfinancing for Economic Justice, 4 
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 310, 336 (2012–13). I describe this Act in further detail below. 
 125.  See Mason, supra note 123, at 227 (explaining that the two major P2P lenders pri-
marily serve customers looking to consolidate debt, and that only 2% of their customers borrow 
for a “business” purpose). 
 126.  Id. at 221. Kiva is an additional well-known P2P platform, but because it is a non-
profit, it has a relatively small market share, and it is mostly focused on microlending, id. at 
221, I omit it from my discussion. 
 127.  Id. at 222. 
 128.  See generally Get Your Custom Rate, PROSPER, 
https://www.prosper.com/borrower/#/prospect/registration?loan_amount=35000&listing_categ
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from Prosper, “the applicant must: ‘(1) have at least a 640 credit 
score, (2) have fewer than seven credit bureau inquiries within 
the last 6 months, (3) have an annual income greater than $0, 
(4) have a debt-to-income ratio below 50%, (5) have at least 
three open trades reported on their credit report, and (6) have 
not filed for bankruptcy within the last 12 months.’”129 Lending 
Club has a slightly more strict standards for “screening poten-
tial borrowers,” including verification of applicants’ self-
reported employment information130 and a credit score re-
quirement of 660.131 
As should be clear from the discussion above, credit 
scores can be used as a form of disparate impact discrimination 
against minority entrepreneurs. The credit score requirements 
for P2P lending came as a response to “increased scrutiny by 
the SEC.”132 While a 640 credit score “is considered fair,” and 
“[p]eople with this credit score may be considered subprime 
borrowers,”133 this bar may be too high for minority entrepre-
neurs who have no credit history or a minimal credit history 
that is predominately negative.134 This effect may be evidenced 




Brand%7C%7Ckw:prosper%7C%7Cad:104726616971%7C%7Cdv:c&type=dm (last visited 
July 5, 2017); Check Your Rate, LENDING CLUB (last accessed July 5, 2017), 
https://www.lendingclub.com/apply/personal/identity?utm_campaign=pl_biz_purpose&loanA
mount=40000&loanPurpose=small_business&creditScore=POOR. 
 129.  Mason, supra note 123, at 222 n.34 (quoting Prosper Funding LLC & Prosper 
Marketplace, Inc., Prospectus at 32 (Form 424(b)(3)) (Aug. 13, 2015) 
https://www.prosper.com/Downloads/Legal/Prosper_Prospectus_2015-08-13.pdf). 
 130.  Id. at 224 (citing Paul Slattery, Square Pegs in A Round Hole: SEC Regulation of 
Online Peer-to-Peer Lending and the CFPB Alternative, 30 YALE J. REG. 233 (2013)). 
 131.  Alexander, supra note 124, at 345. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  640 Credit Score: Is it Good or Bad? EXPERIAN, 
http://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/credit-education/score-basics/640-credit-score/ 
(last visited July 5, 2017). 
 134.  These credit score requirements roughly approximate the average credit scores of 
Black and African Americans (677) as well as Hispanic Americans (701). Robert Harrow, Aver-
age Credit Score in America: 2017 Facts & Figures, VALUE PENGUIN (March 29, 2017), 
https://www.valuepenguin.com/average-credit-score. 
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cation approval rate is only 10%.135 Therefore, some circum-
vention of this requirement would likely still be necessary for 
P2P lending institutions to diminish disparate impact discrimi-
nation costs.136 
Once a potential borrower applies and receives approval 
from the lending platform to pursue a loan, the borrower then 
posts a request to the platform which “include[s] relevant in-
formation about the requested loan.”137 For Prosper, this in-
cludes the term (either three or five years), the rate (between 
5.99% and 36%), and the amount that would be borrowed (be-
tween $2,000 to $35,000), all of which are “determined by 
Prosper . . . based upon the borrower’s credit score.”138 Poten-
tial lenders see these terms as well as the borrower’s “Prosper 
Rating”—a letter grade rating prescribed by Prosper.139 In addi-
tion, at the option of the borrowers, they may disclose addi-
 
 135.  Mason, supra note 123, at 231 (citing Alexandra Mateescu, Peer-to-Peer Lending, 
DATA & SOC’Y RES. INST. 21 (July 1, 2015), 
http://www.datasociety.net/pubs/der/PeertoPeerLending.pdf. 
 136.  At some point, if P2P lending integrates with advanced forms of blockchain tech-
nology, this threshold for minority entrepreneurs could be diminished because blockchain 
would likely resolve the asymmetric information problem. That is, blockchain can “transmit 
richer forms of information, holding promise for many compelling applications beyond” simple 
monetary value. Trevor I. Kiviat, Note, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain 
Transactions, 65 DUKE L. JOUR. 569, 603 (2015). Instead, a typical transaction follows a simple 
script—a set of instructions—that adheres to the three-part structure [of party A sending a val-
ue, Party B accepting that value, and other parties verifying the transaction]. If the script were 
amended to contain additional conditions, users could engage in more sophisticated transac-
tions. For instance, consider that Party A and Party B may want to add a fourth condition to 
that script structure: they only want the transaction to occur at a certain time, or upon the oc-
currence or nonoccurrence of a conditional event. Many possibilities branch out from this idea, 
and it has sparked much discussion around “smart” contracts. Id. at 603 (internal citations omit-
ted). 
Thus, a lending platform could integrate certain scripts that precluded loaned 
money to be spent on items outside the business, limited the ability of the borrower from at-
taining additional loans, and automatically enacted a mock bankruptcy when borrowers were 
near the zone of insolvency. These scripts are currently unavailable to developers “because pro-
tocol amendments require a majority consensus,” but variations on bitcoin do exist and are cur-
rently being tested. Id. at 603–04. Should such scripts be adopted, one may want to reevaluate 
the credit reporting requirements of these lending platforms as the scripts may trigger liquida-
tion events with which the entrepreneur otherwise would not have proceeded. 
 137.  Mason, supra note 123, at 222. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. at 222–23. 
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tional self-reported information, including “the borrower’s 
purpose for requesting the loan, income, occupation, and em-
ployment status”; borrowers that provide such “narrative in-
formation . . . can positively influence a lender’s decision to 
lend to a borrower with an otherwise poor credit rating.”140 
Lenders, or “investors” as they are referred to on these 
platforms, “can provide as little as $25 in a requested loan, re-
gardless of the amount requested by the borrower.”141 If a po-
tential borrower does not receive enough funding over the lim-
ited time period of their posting, the transaction is cancelled.142 
However, if a sufficient amount is aggregated, then the transac-
tion is facilitated by Prosper or Lending Club using “WebBank, 
a [Utah-]chartered bank insured by the FDIC,” to originate the 
loan.143 This aggregation of loans provides more supply of for-
mal loans for minority entrepreneurs, who may be higher risk 
investments, as investors diversify their portfolio.144 
First, P2P lending could diminish the distortion costs 
related to cultural aversions to formal lending by providing a 
cleaner, simpler process of applying for a loan and leaving less 
room for perceived discrimination.145 P2P lending does not 
bundle interest rates with other services; thus, minority entre-
preneurs will be able to feel more confident about the terms of 
the loans in which they enter.146 Likewise, it allows members of 
minority communities to formally lend to one another, and de-
creases the shame that might be associated with being denied a 
loan from a bank.  
In addition, P2P lending can diminish discrimination 
costs by allowing minority entrepreneurs to receive a loan 
without ever revealing their race. Furthermore, minority entre-
 
 140.  Alexander, supra note 124, at 338. 
 141.  Mason, supra note 123, at 223. 
 142.  Id. at 223–24. 
 143.  Id. at 225. 
 144.  See Alexander, supra note 124, at 338. 
 145.  See Mason, supra note 123, at 228–29. 
 146.  Id. 
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preneurs may be able to strategically use their race within their 
narrative to obtain credit from those particularly interested in 
lending to minorities.147 The application process requires only 
that the minority entrepreneur “determine the amount of mon-
ey he or she needs and the length of time he or she needs to pay 
the money back;”148 it does not involve investigation of the 
neighborhood in which the minority entrepreneur resides, 
which precludes the ability of lenders to red-line.149 
Yet P2P lending may also increase discrimination costs. 
Minority entrepreneurs are more likely to receive lower ratings 
because they have lower levels of income, assets, or credit.150 
Therefore, investors may be dissuaded from investing in minor-
ity entrepreneurs because of their heightened risk of non-
repayment. In addition, if a minority does reveal their race in 
the narrative section, investors are currently permitted to dis-
criminate against them,151 whether it be conscious or subcon-
scious.152 For example, if minorities do not share a picture on 
the platform to avoid discrimination, but majority entrepre-
neurs do, then minority entrepreneurs may still be less likely to 
receive a loan because they fail to share enough information; 
i.e., potential borrowers who disclose minimal information may 
appear less trustworthy and attract fewer investors. 
 
 147.  Cf. Elise Schmelzer, New Website Allows White People to Offer ‘Reparations’ Di-
rectly to People of Color, WASH. POST (August 2, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/08/02/new-website-allows-
white-people-to-offer-reparations-directly-to-people-of-color/?utm_term=.6cbab048ff3b. 
        148.    Mason, supra note 123, at 229. 
 149.  Id. However, it still remains unclear whether Prosper or Lending Club is itself en-
gaging in red-lining when determining their credit measure. 
 150.  See supra note 136 discussing a way of circumventing the credit requirement. 
 151.  This is due to the fact that the ECOA currently appears to only apply to the lending 
platform and not the actual lenders. Cf. PETER MANBECK & SAMUEL HU, CHAPMAN & 
CUTLER LLP, THE REGULATION OF PEER-TO-PEER LENDING: A SUMMARY OF THE 
PRINCIPAL ISSUES 25 (April 2014), http://www.lendacademy.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/Regulation-of-P2P-Lending-Chapman-and-Cutler.pdf. 
 152.  For example, P2P lending could effectually imitate behavior similar to the Microsoft 
autobot that quickly became racist. See Rob Price, Microsoft is deleting its AI chatbot’s incred-
ibly racist tweets, BUSINESS INSIDER (March 24, 2016),  http://www.businessinsider.com/micro
soft-deletes-racist-genocidal-tweets-from-ai-chatbot-tay-2016-3. 
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This problem is further amplified by the fact that there 
appears to be no current enforcement of the Community Rein-
vestment Act (CRA)153 on P2P lenders or platforms.154 The 
CRA “requires banks to meet the credit needs of their entire 
communities, including low- and moderate-income (LMI) 
neighborhoods.”155 While the definition of LMI does not take 
race into account, it includes many minority neighborhoods.156 
Without enforcement of the CRA, many minority communities 
are subject to aggregate discrimination costs, losing access to a 
significant credit market. 
The CRA is enforced by four agencies.157 “[R]egulators 
review a bank’s determination of its assessment areas [i.e., defi-
nitions of “community” into which they must reinvest], and is-
sue public written reports that rate banks’ compliance with 
their CRA obligations.”158 These ratings are considered anytime 
a bank applies “to ‘obtain a charter, obtain deposit insurance, 
establish a branch, relocate a home office or branch, merge 
with another bank, or obtain the assets or assume the liabilities 
of another bank.’ A negative CRA rating can cause regulators to 
deny a bank permission to engage in these activities.”159 
Enforcement of the CRA on P2P lending platforms is 
unique because it is unclear what the assessment area is and 
who the lender is. There are likely two options for assessment 
areas: (a) borrowers on the platform; or, (b) actual, physical 
neighborhoods of borrowers.160 In addition, there are likely 
 
 153.  12 U.S.C. § 2901. 
 154.  See Alexander, supra note 124, at 378–79. 
 155.  Richard D. Marsico, Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act: An Advocate’s 
Guide to Making the CRA Work for Communities, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 129, 129 
(2000–01). 
 156.  Alexander, supra note 124, at 329. 
 157.  Marisco, supra note 154, at 131–32. 
 158.  Alexander, supra note 124, at 329–30. 
 159.  Alexander, supra note 124, at 330. 
 160.  Alexander suggests that the “assessment area” be particular “cyberspaces,” yet pro-
vides no real meat to this proposal; thus I may summarize it, but I have forgone analyzing it for 
now. Cf. Alexander, supra note 124, at 378–80. 
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three options for the lender: 1) the platform, 2) the investors, or 
3) the bank controlling the transaction—in  Prosper and Fair 
Lending’s Case, WebBank. 
A framework in which the actual, physical neighbor-
hoods of the borrowers serve as the assessment area would like-
ly be impossible to administer. First, given the emerging reach 
of P2P lending, P2P lenders would be charged with serving 
many physical community definitions with only a few members 
in each area.  Thus, it would be difficult to determine whether 
the platform was adequately serving an LMI area if, for exam-
ple, the platform served a very wealthy individual in a LMI 
community. Further, because geographic information related to 
borrowers is not shared with individual investors, they would 
have no way of knowing whether they have appropriately 
spread their investments to the LMI community of a particular 
neighborhood in which they have invested.  
Thus, it appears that the platform is the most easily 
identified “assessment area,” allowing customers on the plat-
form to be considered the “community.” By relying on this vir-
tual definition of community, the platform can ensure it is 
reaching those least likely to have access to formal lending from 
those who apply on its platform. That said, these platforms 
would still need to be regulated so that they did not make 
themselves to be unattractive to minority entrepreneurs. 
With respect to the question of who the “lender” is, it is 
unlikely to be the individual investor as it would be extraordi-
narily difficult for a regulator, not to mention the investor her-
self, to determine whether the loans she provides are propor-
tionately being made to members of the LMI community 
within the platform. One way around this would be for regula-
tors to require platforms to be configured so that a percentage 
of each investors’ investments go towards an LMI borrower. 
That said, doing so may significantly dissuade lenders from the 
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platform if as it requires many lenders to increase their risk tol-
erance.161 
It is also unlikely that the bank controlling the transac-
tion—in our case WebBank—could be considered the lender, 
because it is simply a facilitator of the loans and does not have 
control over the lending platform. Thus, the platform is likely 
the most easily regulated “lender” faced with bearing the bur-
den of ensuring that LMI members of its community are re-
ceiving an appropriate amount of loans. The platform could re-
quire investors that reach a certain level to put some part of 
their investment toward an LMI member. Alternatively, the 
platform could subsidize a proportionate number of LMI 
members and highlight them on the webpage to encourage 
other investors to lend. 
In total, it is unlikely that P2P lending is a promising 
tool for diminishing the distortion costs of cultural aversion and 
discrimination. It is easily accessible by minorities and would 
likely not have the same stigma as a bank. That said, it would 
still need to be regulated in such a way that it did not create 
even more disparate impact discrimination towards minority 
borrowers. These regulations could come through adapting the 
CRA to P2P lending, requiring the subsidization of loans to 
minority entrepreneurs, and developing more minority friendly 
borrower standards. One other caveat is that it remains ques-
tionable as to whether P2P lending will be able to break into 
the business lending market. The typical P2P loan is to provide 
debt consolidation; however, only 2% of Prosper and Lending 
Club’s customers borrow for a business purpose.162 This result 
is likely due to the relatively low cap on the allowable borrowed 
 
 161.  That said, such an activity may actually promote minority entrepreneurs further by 
requiring interaction between the different social class groups. By doing so, investors who may 
have never attempted to engage in such investments may be more willing to invest in future 
minority entrepreneurs. 
 162.  Id. at 227. 
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amount, namely $35,000.163 Both Prosper and Lending Club 
have developed business loan platforms, OnDeck and Lending 
Club: Business Loans,164 respectively, which permit loans of up 
to $500,000 and $300,000. Yet, OnDeck requires that the busi-
nesses be operating for at least one year and have a minimum 
$100,000 in annual revenue.165 Similarly, Lending Club re-
quires that the business have a two year operating history with 
annual revenue of at least $75,000.166 These limitations would 
likely preclude the minority entrepreneur from gaining access 
to start-up costs for their business and act as further distortion 
costs within the minority entrepreneur’s fast failure decision. 
Thus, despite its promise, it remains uncertain whether P2P 
lending will be able to diminish the distortion costs incurred on 
the minority entrepreneur’s fast failure decision. With that in 
mind, I next turn to a set of incremental regulatory proposals 
that provide an alternative, as well as coordinative, route to di-







 163.  See generally PROSPER (last accessed July 5, 2017), https://www.prosper.com/. 





LENDING CLUB BUSINESS LOANS (last accessed July 5, 2017), 
https://www.lendingclub.com/business/?utm_source=LC&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=
pl_biz_purpose&u=2 (last visited July 5, 2017). 





visited July 5, 2017) 
 166.  Id. 
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B. Incremental Regulations to Diminish Distortion Costs 
Within the Minority Entrepreneur’s Fast Failure Decision  
 
Given the lack of a private ordering solution,167 the fol-
lowing regulatory suggestions would likely diminish the distor-
tion costs of discrimination, cultural aversion, and access to 
counsel found within the minority entrepreneur’s fast failure 
decision. First, I propose a mandatory educational program to 
accompany SBA loans that would diminish the distortion costs 
of cultural aversions and access to legal counsel by informing 
the borrower of the benefits of failing fast and the different 
types of bankruptcy. Second, to diminish discrimination costs, I 
propose that banks be required to defer interactions between a 
loan assessor and a potential borrower where discrimination 
could occur to isolated instances near the end of the loan ap-
proval process. Third, I propose a stricter standard for assessing 
loans using big data and avoiding any reliance on personal 
judgment. Finally, because even with these regulatory tools, 
minority entrepreneurs may still suffer from significant dispar-
ate impact discrimination, my fourth proposal is that the gov-
ernment subsidize minority loans through a program similar to 
the SBA loan guarantee program.  
 
1. Mandatory educational program encouraging fast failure 
 
As mentioned above, one significant problem for minor-
ity entrepreneurs is that they lack access to legal counsel who 
can advise the entrepreneur prior to the fast failure decision of 
the benefits of fast failure and the mechanisms that encourage 
fast failure, such as bankruptcy.168 My proposal builds on the in-
tuition that if an entrepreneur were required to learn about 
these benefits upon receiving a loan, the entrepreneur would 
 
 167.  See supra Section IV.A. 
 168.  See supra Section III.C. 
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likely allocate resources would more efficiently because she 
would have a better sense as to when she should fail and pursue 
bankruptcy.  
Currently there is no mandatory educational program 
when taking out a small business loan. This contrasts with U.S. 
microfinancing, which requires micro-entrepreneurs to partici-
pate in several meetings and educational programs.169 Con-
sistent programs that require significant time commitments dis-
suade entrepreneurs from participating in microfinancing170 and 
would likely be inappropriate for minority entrepreneurs look-
ing for credit at higher levels. However, a short, one-to-two-
hour online program that requires entrepreneurs to think 
through certain failure situations would not only educate them 
on the benefits of failing fast and bankruptcy, but also diminish 
their cultural aversions to bankruptcy and failure.  
Of course, this program could carry a significant initial 
cost because it would require experts in education, business, 
and law to construct instructional material. There would also 
be costs in tailoring the program to multiple education levels 
and languages. That said, the small business loan guarantee 
program could easily implement the proposed program by 
making it an additional requirement on entrepreneurs before 
providing them with a subsidized loan.171 
 
2. Color-blind loan assessment 
 
Formal lending institutions typically require a face-to-
face visit before providing a business loan, and often encourage 
speaking with a representative.172 Yet, doing so invites opportu-
 
 169.  See Alexander, supra note 123, at 327. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Cf. Steve Nicastro, How to Qualify for a Small-Business Loan in 5 Steps, 
NERDWALLET (April 4, 2017) https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/small-business/how-to-
qualify-for-small-business-loans/ (discussing the current requirements for qualifying for an SBA 
subsidized loan). 
 172.  See, e.g., Securing a Business Line of Credit, BANK OF AMERICA (last visited May 5, 
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nities for threshold discriminatory practices.173 These opportu-
nities for discrimination potentially increase not only the dis-
crimination costs in the model, but also the cultural aversion 
costs of individuals who may feel threatened by the institution 
that engages in discriminatory lending.  
Thus, I propose that banks be required to provide suffi-
cient tools online for an entrepreneur to apply for a small busi-
ness loan without ever revealing their racial identity. Banks are 
already transitioning to a more online presence and this tool 
would be another step in that direction. Alternatively, if lenders 
insist that they must meet the borrower before issuing a loan, 
the meeting should be the last step before receiving the loan. 
Placing the meeting last would effectively reduce perceptions of 
discrimination and isolate any potential discriminatory actions, 
diminishing discrimination costs. 
This regulation could be integrated within the compre-
hensive “Regulation B” that currently implements the ECOA. 
Regulation B forbids creditors from “request[ing] or col-
lect[ing] information about an applicant’s race,” except in “situ-
ations in which the information is necessary to test for compli-
ance with fair lending rules,” or “[t]o determine the applicant’s 
eligibility for special purpose credit programs.”174 The CFPB, 
which currently enforces Regulation B, could interpret this 
regulation to mean that banks must avoid requesting such in-
formation and require banks organize as color-blind a process 
for potential borrowers as possible. 
Ensuring that loan applications remain color-blind 
would likely diminish discrimination costs as well as cultural 
aversion costs developed from perceived discrimination. That 
 
2017), https://www.bankofamerica.com/smallbusiness/business-financing/working-
capital/business-line-of-credit.go; Small Business Credit, WELLS FARGO (last visited May 5, 
2017), https://www.wellsfargo.com/biz/business-credit/. 
 173.  See supra Section III.A. 
 174.  Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT 
(ECOA) (June 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_laws-and-
regulations_ecoa-combined-june-2013.pdf (summarizing 12 CFR 1002.5). 
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said, increasing the color-blindness of the application process 
may lead to more active red-lining that is untraced because of a 
lack of initial data, leading to my next proposal. 
 
3. Big data loan and credit assessment 
 
In the world of big data, traditional tests for determining 
the interest rate of a potential borrower based on zip codes or 
neighborhoods are likely outdated and inundated with preju-
dice. While there are potentially significant risks to using big 
data to assess the creditworthiness of an entrepreneur,175 lend-
ing institutions should be mandated to use the most detailed 
predictive data that they are cost-effectively capable of utilizing. 
Further, banks should be required to ensure that their data will 
not have a disparate impact on minority entrepreneurs. 
Once again, this requirement could be integrated 
through Regulation B. Currently, Regulation B prohibits using 
information that has “the effect of discriminating against an ap-
plicant on a prohibited basis.”176 Yet, “Regulation B neither re-
quires nor endorses any particular method of credit analysis” 
and permits creditors to “use traditional methods, such as 
judgmental systems that rely on a credit officer’s subjective 
evaluation of an applicant’s creditworthiness . . . .”177 
Regulation B should require that any subjective evalua-
tion be deferred until the final step of the application process. 
Subjective evaluations open the assessment up to stereotypes 
that typically infect a judgment process when the evaluator is 
less motivated to actually make an independent assessment.178 
Because minority entrepreneurs already are likely to have more 
 
 175.  See generally Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big 
Data, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 148 (2016) (describing the challenges with transparency in using 
big data to calculate credit scores). 
 176.  Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, supra note 183, at 6 (emphasis in original). 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  See Galen v. Bodenhausen Stereotypes as Judgmental Heuristics: Evidence of Cir-
cadian Variations in Discrimination, 1 PSYCHOL. SCI. 319, 319 (1990). 
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credit difficulties, as well as less revenue than their majority 
counterparts,179 loan application assessors may use these charac-
teristics, combined with stereotypes, to simply reject the loan 
application. However, if the applicant’s race was not revealed 
until the end of the assessment stage, the evaluator would have 
more pressure to ensure the assessment was independent and 
not based on race, because regulators could more easily isolate 
whether race was the final variable that prevented the loan ap-
plicant from receiving a fair loan. 
Therefore, by requiring banks to utilize big data meth-
ods that are purposefully designed to avoid disparate impact 
discrimination—and by postponing the revelation of race, as 
well as subjective evaluations, until the final step in the loan ap-
plication process—discrimination and cultural aversion costs 
would likely see a significant decrease. That said, it may be 
practically impossible to design a big data assessment tool that 
completely evades disparate impact discrimination, which 
means further interference is necessary to balance the scales: af-
firmative subsidies. 
 
4. Affirmative subsidies for minority entrepreneurs 
 
As discussed above, minority entrepreneurs are typically 
less creditworthy and have less revenue than their majority 
counterparts.180 Thus, even the most sophisticated big data 
tools may effect a disparate impact on minorities.181 To combat 
this disparate impact and ensure the distortion costs of discrim-
ination are diminished for minority entrepreneurs, the SBA 
should create a loan guarantee program specifically target mi-
nority entrepreneurs. This program would provide minorities 
with loans that have higher government guarantees, incentiviz-
 
 179.  See Fact Sheet, supra note 1. 
 180.  See Fact Sheet, supra note 1. 
 181.  See supra note 174. 
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ing lenders to target minority entrepreneurs as profitable cus-
tomers.  
As discussed above, the SBA loan guarantee program has signif-
icantly increased economic performance in minority communi-
ties.182 That said, it remains unclear whether it is actually di-
minishing the individual costs of discrimination for minority 
entrepreneurs.183 Targeting minority entrepreneurs with a simi-
lar, more attractive loan guarantee program would likely dimin-





In this comment, I provided a novel model of the typical 
entrepreneur’s fast failure decision, examining the social costs 
and benefits associated with this decision as well as how formal 
lending and bankruptcy make fast failure possible. Further, I 
distinguished the minority entrepreneur’s fast failure decision 
from her majority counterpart’s decision by highlighting the 
additional distortion costs on the minority entrepreneur: dis-
crimination, cultural aversion, and access to legal counsel. I 
spelled out the weaknesses of current attempts to diminish 
these costs and introduced five proposals that would more di-
rectly work to put the minority entrepreneur on par with her 
majority counterpart: P2P lending; a mandatory “fast failure” 
education program; a color-blind application process; an as-
sessment system that emphasizes big data and strays from sub-
 
 182.  Craig et al., supra note 97, at 92. 
 183.  Id. at 92–93. 
 184.  Such a program would, of course, need to be implemented with care; however, due 
to limited space in this essay, I have not specified the particular details of such a proposal. For 
other programs that incentivize minority entrepreneurship, see Paul M. Ong, Set-Aside Con-
tracting in S.B.A.’s 8(a) Program, REV. OF BLACK POL.ECON. 59 (2001); Jess H. Drabkin, Mi-
nority Enterprise Development and the Small Business Administration’s Section 8(a) Program: 
Constitutional Basis and Regulatory Implementation, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 433 (1982-83). 
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jective evaluation; and a minority loan subsidy program.  Each 
of these proposals deserve more time to work out their nuances, 
but I hope this comment provides a groundwork for that pro-
ject. 
Jesse P. Houchens* 
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